Bab el-Mandeb strait shipping: what passes and who depends on it

Bab el-Mandeb strait shipping carried about 4.2 million barrels per day of crude and refined products in the first half of 2025, down from 9.3 mb/d in 2023, on EIA estimates from Vortexa tracking. The strait is the southern gate of the Red Sea and the only sea entrance to the Suez Canal, so everything moving between Asia and Europe by the short route passes a channel about 26 km wide at its narrowest. In normal conditions roughly 12% of world trade goes through it, including about 11% of seaborne oil and 8% of LNG.

Unlike the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb has a physical alternative: the Cape of Good Hope. Cargo here is not trapped, it is taxed, in time and in tonnage. The EIA puts an Arabian Sea to Netherlands voyage at 19 days through Suez against 34 days around Africa, and oil around the cape rose to 9.1 mb/d in the first half of 2025 from 6.2 mb/d in 2023.

As of mid September 2026 the strait is under the effective control of Yemen's Houthis, who took Mocha, the Hanish and Zuqar islands, Dhubab and finally Perim island between 8 and 12 September 2026. The group declared a maritime embargo on Saudi shipping on 20 July 2026 and has barred Saudi-flagged vessels. Transits fell to 15 on 11 September from 30 the day before, on Kpler data. The timing matters: the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since 28 February 2026, Saudi Arabia rerouted 4 to 5 mb/d of crude to Yanbu to get around it, and drones launched from Iraq on 10 and 11 September shut that pipeline too. Both of the kingdom's export corridors are impaired at once.

Key numbers

The EIA series based on Vortexa is used throughout this page. S&P Global Commodities at Sea tracks the same corridor on a narrower vessel and cargo scope, putting 2023 flows at 6.9 mb/d and 2024 at 2.5 mb/d.

What flows through the Bab el-Mandeb: oil, products, containers and grain

In 2023 the split was roughly even between crude and refined products, 4.7 mb/d and 4.6 mb/d. Total flow fell to 4.1 mb/d in 2024, and the campaign hit products hardest: by the first half of 2025 crude and condensate had fallen to 2.4 mb/d and products to 1.8 mb/d. Russia became the largest single shipper of crude through the strait in that period, mostly to India, because Russian tonnage was never a target and the routing survived intact.

LNG left first and has only partly returned. Flows were 4.2 Bcf/d in 2023 and effectively zero in 2024 and the first half of 2025, after QatarEnergy stopped routing carriers past Yemen in January 2024. EIA quarterly data show 2.9 Bcf/d back in the first quarter of 2026, a consequence of Hormuz: with Gulf LNG locked in, Atlantic basin cargoes for Asia took the short route again. See natural gas for the wider trade map.

Containers never came back. Carriers moved almost the entire Asia to Europe box trade onto the Cape route from December 2023, and Suez container transits in the fourth quarter of 2025 were still 86% below 2023, per BIMCO. Bulk carriers, product tankers and vehicle carriers stayed, which is why the transit count held up better than the tonnage.

Who depends on Bab el-Mandeb strait shipping

Egypt is the most directly exposed state. The Suez Canal takes no southern traffic that has not first passed Bab el-Mandeb, and canal receipts are a pillar of Egyptian foreign currency earnings. Egypt lost about $7bn between 2023 and 2024, around 60% of canal revenue, on official figures. Suez Canal Authority revenue was $4.67bn in fiscal 2025/2026, 23% above the previous year but far below the $9.4bn of fiscal 2023, on 14,000 to 15,000 vessels a year against about 26,000 in 2023.

Saudi Arabia became the exposed party the market watches after February 2026. With Hormuz shut, Yanbu turned into the kingdom's relief valve, and exports from there through the strait went from 240,000 b/d in June 2025 to 3.5 mb/d in June 2026. The Houthi embargo of 20 July 2026 was aimed precisely at that valve, and the 10 September pipeline strike removed the feed behind it.

Asian buyers absorb most of the oil heading south and east, India above all, then China. Europe is exposed on the other side of the ledger, through delivery times and freight rather than volume. Israel lost its Red Sea outlet entirely when the port of Eilat, down 85% in activity, went bankrupt and shut, while Djibouti, which lives on bunkering and transshipment at the mouth of the strait, and Sudan, which imports through Port Sudan, sit downstream without leverage.

Alternatives and bypass routes

The insufficiency of the alternatives defines a chokepoint, and here the arithmetic is unusual: one real alternative exists, and it works, at a price.

Cape of Good Hope. The only genuine bypass. It adds roughly 6,000 nautical miles, 10 to 14 days and around $1m in fuel per Asia to Europe voyage, on Defense Intelligence Agency estimates, and absorbed 15% to 20% of effective global container capacity when the whole trade moved across in 2024, per Maersk. Oil around the cape ran at 9.1 mb/d in the first half of 2025 against 6.2 mb/d in 2023. Detail at Cape of Good Hope.

Suez Canal and SUMED. Neither is a bypass of Bab el-Mandeb, the point most often got wrong. Both sit north of the strait and serve only cargo already inside the Red Sea, which makes them a bypass for Yanbu loadings and nothing else. SUMED moves 2.5 mb/d between Ain Sukhna and Sidi Kerir, and Saudi Arabia has pushed about 1.9 mb/d of crude through it to the Mediterranean, with partial loading at Yanbu and topping up at Sidi Kerir.

Saudi East-West pipeline (Petroline). Bypasses Hormuz, not Bab el-Mandeb. Abqaiq to Yanbu, 1,200 km, up to 7 mb/d design capacity, carrying 4 to 5 mb/d after February 2026. Crude that reaches Yanbu still has to leave: north through Suez, south through the strait, or around Africa. Shut as a precaution after the drone strikes of 10 and 11 September 2026, with Yanbu holding five to seven days of stock.

Nothing crosses Yemen or the Horn. No pipeline links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden overland, and the Eilat to Ashkelon line is not commercially available. Gulf crude leaving a Red Sea terminal for Asia has two options: the strait, or 34 days around Africa.

The strait therefore costs time rather than barrels, which is why its closures raise freight and insurance before they raise crude. The exception is the configuration of September 2026, with both chokepoints impaired and the pipeline between them down. Ambrey estimated a full closure here would halt Saudi exports to Asia and remove around 7% of global oil supply. Brent traded above $100 in mid September 2026, and above $108 after the Petroline strike.

Historical incidents

Assets and companies exposed

Shipowners and operators. Bahri, the Saudi national carrier, is the most exposed fleet under the embargo, with a VLCC hit off Yanbu on 24 August 2026. Tanker owners in Red Sea trades, including Frontline, DHT, Euronav, Torm and Hafnia, face both the premium and the rerouting. The tonne-mile effect cuts the other way: the same disruption tightens the fleet and lifts rates, and a third VLCC spot spike since February 2026 came in early September.

Container lines. Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, COSCO and Evergreen moved the Asia to Europe network onto the Cape route and have returned only partially, through trial services such as the Maersk India to US reefer run of early 2026.

Insurers. Lloyd's syndicates and the P&I clubs write the war risk cover that decides whether a transit is commercially possible. The market no longer quotes a single Red Sea number: it prices the southern Red Sea, the strait itself, Saudi-linked tonnage and northern Saudi ports, still around 0.1% of hull value in July 2026, separately.

Producers, terminals and sovereigns. Saudi Aramco through Yanbu, Jizan and the East-West pipeline; Yanbu refiners processing more than 1 million b/d; Egyptian storage at Ain Sukhna and Sidi Kerir; the Suez Canal Authority; Djibouti's bunkering and transshipment business; Port Sudan; and the closed port of Eilat.

Beneficiaries by displacement. Cape route bunkering and salvage services, tanker owners with spot exposure, and refiners outside the corridor supplying product Europe could no longer source quickly from the Gulf. Descriptive only: the encyclopedia does not publish recommendations.

What to watch

• Daily and weekly transits: IMF PortWatch for daily counts, the Lloyd's List Intelligence Red Sea Transit Monitor for vessels over 10,000 dwt. Reference points: about 75 a day before November 2023, about 31 through the campaign, 319 a week before the July 2026 embargo and 273 after.
• War risk quotes: Marsh and Lloyd's List publish indicative levels. The market splits the corridor by affiliation, so the spread between the generic rate and the Saudi-linked rate says more than either alone.
• Petroline status and Yanbu loadings: Saudi Ministry of Energy and Aramco statements on repairs, plus Kpler and Vortexa loading data. Yanbu holds five to seven days of stock, so the repair clock binds.
• Suez Canal Authority monthly transits and revenue: the cleanest public proxy for whether owners believe the route is safe. The SCA targeted $5.8bn to $6bn for 2026.
• Houthi targeting criteria: statements from the military spokesman and the notices sent to insurers, which in the 2023 to 2025 campaign defined the risk perimeter more precisely than naval posture did, and whether Operation Aspides or the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance obtain rules of engagement beyond self-protection.

FAQ

How much oil passes through the Bab el-Mandeb strait? About 4.2 million barrels per day of crude and refined products in the first half of 2025, on EIA estimates from Vortexa tracking. That is less than half the 9.3 mb/d of 2023, the difference having gone around the Cape of Good Hope. Crude and condensate recovered to 5.4 mb/d in the first quarter of 2026 as Saudi barrels were redirected to the Red Sea to escape the closure of Hormuz.

Is the Bab el-Mandeb strait closed right now? Not formally, but as of mid September 2026 it is under Houthi fire control and closed in practice to Saudi-linked tonnage. The group declared a maritime embargo on Saudi shipping on 20 July 2026 and completed its seizure of Yemen's Red Sea coast, including Perim island, on 12 September. Transits fell to 15 that week against a pre crisis norm of about 75 a day, with other traffic still moving at elevated war risk premiums.

Can ships avoid the Bab el-Mandeb strait? Yes, around the Cape of Good Hope, which is the difference between this strait and Hormuz. The detour adds roughly 6,000 nautical miles and 10 to 14 days: the EIA puts an Arabian Sea to Netherlands voyage at 19 days via Suez and 34 around Africa. The Suez Canal and SUMED are not alternatives, since both sit north of the strait and only serve cargo already inside the Red Sea.

Who controls the Bab el-Mandeb strait? Yemen holds the eastern shore, Djibouti and Eritrea the western, and Perim island splits the passage into a 2.5 to 5 km eastern channel and a wider western one. Yemen's Houthis captured Mocha, Dhubab, the Hanish and Zuqar islands and Perim between 8 and 12 September 2026, taking positions about 20 km from the African shore. No single state controls the waterway, so transit risk is set by whoever can reach it with missiles and drones.

Why does the Bab el-Mandeb strait matter for the Suez Canal? Every ship reaching Suez from the south passes Bab el-Mandeb first, so the two stand or fall together. When the Houthi campaign emptied the strait, Egypt lost about $7bn between 2023 and 2024, roughly 60% of canal revenue, and the canal handled 14,000 to 15,000 vessels a year against about 26,000 in 2023.