Russian seaborne crude exports: routes, buyers, shadow fleet
Russia exports roughly 3.9 million barrels of crude oil per day by sea, its single largest source of export revenue and the part of its oil trade most exposed to sanctions, insurance restrictions and, since 2025, direct drone attack. About a quarter of that flow loads at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, a port now inside the reach of Ukrainian naval drones.
The trade rests on four port clusters, a parallel tanker fleet built to evade the G7 price cap, and a buyer base concentrated in two countries. All three are under pressure at once as of mid-2026.
Key numbers
| Metric | Value | Source | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seaborne crude exports | ~3.88 mb/d | KSE Institute (Kpler data) | May 2026 |
| Seaborne oil product exports | ~1.89 mb/d | KSE Institute | May 2026 |
| Novorossiysk crude loadings (Black Sea) | >980 kb/d, +68% m/m | Bloomberg; CREA | Jun 2026 |
| Imports by India | 1.9 mb/d (+23% m/m) | KSE Institute | May 2026 |
| Imports by China | 1.2 mb/d | KSE Institute | May 2026 |
| Imports by Turkey | 130 kb/d, lowest since 2022 | KSE Institute | May 2026 |
| Oil tankers under G7+ sanctions | 653 unique vessels | KSE Institute | Jun 17, 2026 |
| Share carried by sanctioned shadow tankers | 54% of seaborne oil | CREA | Jun 2026 |
| G7/EU price cap on crude | US$44.10/bbl | European Commission | Feb 1, 2026 |
| Monthly oil export revenue | US$20.8 bn | KSE Institute | Apr 2026 |
How the dependency works
Russian crude leaves by sea from four clusters. The Baltic ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga ship Urals westward around Europe to Asia. The Black Sea port of Novorossiysk ships Urals through the Turkish Straits; it loaded more than 980 kb/d in June 2026, its highest level of the war, as drone strikes on refineries pushed unrefined barrels toward export. The Pacific ports of Kozmino and De Kastri ship ESPO and Sokol grades on short routes to China. Arctic terminals near Murmansk carry the remainder.
Novorossiysk shares its bay with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal, the main outlet for Kazakh crude. The two flows are legally distinct but geographically inseparable, which is why attacks in the area spill over into CPC exports.
Moving the oil requires ships and insurance, the trade's most fragile layer. Since December 2022, Western shipping and insurance may only carry Russian crude sold at or below the G7 cap, US$44.10 per barrel since February 2026 under an EU mechanism holding it 15% below the 22-week average Urals price. Russia's answer was the shadow fleet: aging tankers under opaque ownership and non-Western insurance. By June 2026, 653 were under coalition sanctions, yet sanctioned shadow tankers still carried 54% of Russia's seaborne oil (CREA). When refinery strikes forced extra crude onto the water in spring 2026, the shadow fleet proved too small, pushing roughly 42% of volumes back onto Western-insured shipping (KSE Institute, May 2026).
The buyer base is narrow. Since the cap began, China has taken about 51% of Russian crude exports and India about 38% (CREA). India imported 1.9 mb/d in May 2026 and set a wartime record in June, while Turkey cut purchases to 130 kb/d, its lowest since the invasion, replacing Russian barrels with US crude.
Why it exists
Before 2022, pipelines to Europe carried much of Russia's crude. The EU embargo of December 2022 closed most of that market, leaving Druzhba as a residual line to Hungary and Slovakia. The replacement buyers sit in Asia, no eastward pipeline of that scale exists, and discounts against Brent became the price of admission. Seaborne capacity is not one option among several for Russia; it is the load-bearing structure of its oil revenue.
Risks and disruption scenarios
Three pressure points define the risk picture as of July 2026. First, physical attack: Ukraine's drone campaign moved from the Sea of Azov, where it struck 116 shadow-fleet vessels in eight days of early July, to the Black Sea proper, hitting 17 tankers, two gas carriers and a tug on July 15. Russia closed the Kerch Strait and suspended the Don-Azov channel in response. A sustained campaign around Novorossiysk would threaten roughly a quarter of seaborne crude exports ⏳ (share derived from Bloomberg port data over KSE export totals; not published as a single figure by either source).
Second, services withdrawal: after attacks reached the Mediterranean in December 2025, Turkish operator Besiktas Shipping exited all Russian-linked trade. Each exit shrinks the carrier pool and raises freight and war-risk costs on the rest.
Third, enforcement and price: the EU suspended the cap's automatic adjustment until July 23, 2026 to stop it rising mechanically after the Strait of Hormuz closure lifted global prices. Where the cap settles, and how strictly attached services are policed, sets the margin Russia keeps on every Western-carried barrel.
Diversification efforts
Russia's counter-moves run east and north. Chinese buyers already source most of their Russian barrels as ESPO grade from Pacific ports, a short route beyond the reach of current attacks. In the Arctic, the first phase of the Vostok Oil project is expected to add up to 600 kb/d of export capacity by end-2026 (Argus estimates via Vortexa), partially insulating flows from strike exposure. The shadow fleet itself keeps mutating, reflagging vessels faster than registries deregister them (CREA).
Historical incidents
| Date | Event | Observed impact | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 15, 2026 | Ukraine strikes 17 oil tankers, 2 gas carriers and a tug in the Black Sea | Campaign extends from Azov to the main crude export corridor | Bloomberg; OilPrice |
| Jul 7 to 14, 2026 | 116 shadow-fleet vessels struck in the Sea of Azov over eight days | Russia closes the Kerch Strait and suspends the Don-Azov channel | Reuters; OilPrice |
| Mar 2026 | Drone strikes on Baltic ports Primorsk and Ust-Luga | Loadings at both ports fall 53% over nine days | CREA |
| Dec 2025 | Attacks reach the Mediterranean (Midvolga 2, Dashan); Besiktas Shipping exits Russian trade | War-risk exposure extends beyond the Black Sea; carrier pool shrinks | Lloyd's List; Reuters |
| Dec 5, 2022 | G7 price cap on Russian crude takes effect | Shadow fleet expansion begins | European Commission |
What to watch
Novorossiysk loading volumes (Bloomberg, Kpler) show whether the Black Sea leg is absorbing or losing flow. Kerch Strait status signals how far Russia will constrain its own logistics for protection. War-risk premiums for Black Sea calls price the campaign in real time. The EU decision due July 23, 2026 sets the cap's trajectory. The KSE Institute's monthly count of sanctioned tankers still loading is the cleanest single measure of enforcement.
FAQ
How much crude oil does Russia export by sea? About 3.88 million barrels per day as of May 2026, according to the KSE Institute using Kpler data, plus roughly 1.89 mb/d of refined products. Seaborne routes carry the large majority of Russia's oil exports since the EU embargo closed most pipeline markets.
Which countries buy Russian seaborne crude? India and China dominate. In May 2026 India imported 1.9 mb/d and China 1.2 mb/d, while Turkey fell to 130 kb/d. Cumulatively since December 2022, China has taken about 51% and India about 38% of Russian crude exports (CREA).
What is Russia's shadow fleet? A parallel fleet of tankers with non-Western ownership, flags and insurance, assembled to move crude priced above the G7 cap. As of June 17, 2026, coalition jurisdictions had sanctioned 653 of these vessels, yet sanctioned tankers still carried 54% of Russia's seaborne oil that month.
What is the current price cap on Russian oil? US$44.10 per barrel for crude since February 1, 2026, set by an EU mechanism holding the cap 15% below the 22-week average Urals price. The automatic adjustment was suspended until July 23, 2026 after the Hormuz closure pushed global prices up.
How much Russian oil moves through the Black Sea? Novorossiysk, Russia's largest Black Sea oil port, loaded more than 980,000 barrels per day of crude in June 2026 (Bloomberg), on the order of a quarter of Russia's seaborne crude exports, before transiting the Turkish Straits.
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