Europe gas dependence: where the EU gets its gas after Russia

Europe's gas dependence has changed shape rather than size. The EU imported roughly 289 bcm of natural gas in 2025: Norway supplied 30.9%, the United States 26.2%, North Africa 12.7% and Russia 12.5%, down from over 150 bcm and about 45% of imports in 2021, according to European Commission data published by the Council. Half of that supply now arrives as LNG instead of pipeline gas, which is why the 2026 closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a route Europe barely uses directly, still pushed the TTF benchmark to its highest level since 2022.

The EU produces little gas of its own, the Groningen field is shut, and consumption, although 19% lower than in 2021, still runs around 330 bcm a year (Eurostat, 2024 ⏳ verify against the 2025 balance) with gas heating about 30% of households and supplying a third of power and heat generation. Every winter therefore depends on three things the EU does not control: Norwegian pipeline output, the global LNG spot market and the weather.

Key numbers

How Europe's gas dependence works

Three physical systems feed the EU. Norwegian pipelines (Langeled, Europipe, Franpipe, Zeepipe) land in the UK, Germany, Belgium and France and delivered a flat 89 bcm in 2025; Norway is the largest single supplier and its summer maintenance schedule is the main seasonal swing factor. North African pipelines (Transmed and TTPC to Italy, Medgaz to Spain, plus Libya's Greenstream) carried about 37 bcm. Azerbaijan's Southern Gas Corridor adds 11 bcm via Türkiye and Greece.

The rest is LNG, received at a network of terminals and FSRUs led by France (22.8 MT in 2025, per GIIGNL), the Netherlands (16.9 MT), Spain (16.1 MT), Italy (14.5 MT), Belgium (10.2 MT) and Germany (7.6 MT, all via FSRUs built since 2022). The United States supplied 58% of Europe's LNG in 2025 and, with Qatar constrained, IEEFA expects that share to approach two thirds in 2026. Russian LNG from Yamal still lands mostly in France, Belgium and Spain under long-term contracts that expire under the new regulation on 1 January 2027.

Contractually, Europe buys more on the spot and short-term market than any other region: about 35% of global LNG traded spot in 2025, and Europe's incremental cargoes are the swing supply that competes directly with Asian buyers. The TTF price is the mechanism that pulls Atlantic cargoes east or west.

Why it exists

Domestic output collapsed before demand did. Dutch, UK and Danish fields have been in decline since the 2000s; Groningen closed in 2024. Russia filled the gap cheaply for two decades, reaching about 45% of EU imports in 2021 through Nord Stream, the Yamal-Europe line and the Ukrainian transit system. When Gazprom cut flows in 2022 and Nord Stream was sabotaged that September, the EU had no pipeline alternative at scale and turned to LNG, which is why the import bill and price volatility rose even as volumes fell. The Ukrainian transit contract expired on 1 January 2025, removing the last major Russian pipeline route except TurkStream.

Risks and disruption scenarios

The 2022 crisis set the reference: TTF spiked above €300/MWh in August 2022, the EU cut demand 15% by mandate and industrial gas users lost output. The 2026 shock is different in origin and shape. Europe takes only about 7% of its LNG through Hormuz, but the loss of roughly 20% of global LNG supply forced Asian buyers onto the same Atlantic cargoes Europe needed to refill storage, and the March 2026 missile damage at Ras Laffan (12.8 MTPA offline for years, per QatarEnergy) turned a shipping disruption into a capacity loss. TTF rose about 60% in March 2026 and reached €84/MWh in mid-September as storage lagged the seasonal norm by close to 20 percentage points.

The remaining structural risks are Norwegian outages (a single Troll or Kollsnes incident moves the market), Russian LNG removal in 2027 without replacement contracts, a cold winter with storage below target, and Red Sea attacks lengthening Qatari and Gulf voyages. On the pipeline side, TurkStream is now the only Russian route and its transit through the Turkish Straits region and Hungary's and Slovakia's exemptions are political variables. See Strait of Hormuz for the LNG side of the current disruption.

Diversification efforts

• Regulation (EU) 2026/261 (adopted 26 January 2026, in force 18 March 2026) bans new Russian gas contracts immediately, ends short-term contracts on 25 April 2026 (LNG) and 17 June 2026 (pipeline), long-term LNG on 1 January 2027 and long-term pipeline on 30 September 2027 (1 November at the latest if storage targets are missed). Member states had to file national diversification plans by 1 March 2026.
• US supply. Imports tripled from 18.9 bcm in 2021 to 75.6 bcm in 2025; the July 2025 EU-US trade framework included a $750 billion energy purchase commitment, and US liquefaction capacity under construction exceeds 100 MTPA.
• Qatar. North Field East was due to add 33 MTPA from late 2026; GIIGNL now expects the start-up to slip because of the Hormuz crisis and Ras Laffan repairs.
• Regasification. Germany's second Wilhelmshaven FSRU started in Q2 2025; EU27+UK regasification utilisation was still only around 60% in 2025, so import capacity is not the binding constraint.
• Demand. REPowerEU targets a 44% fall in EU gas demand between 2025 and 2030 per IEEFA; actual consumption rose 2% in 2025 on weaker wind and hydro output.
• Storage rules. The 90% fill target was relaxed to 80% for 2026 with a further 4-point flexibility, trading resilience for cost.

Historical incidents

What to watch

• Storage trajectory vs the 80% target: GIE AGSI+ daily data; the gap to the five-year average is the single best indicator of winter risk.
• Norwegian flows and maintenance: Gassco's nomination data and outage notices.
• LNG arrivals by origin: Eurostat quarterly shares and GIIGNL; the Russian share must fall to zero by 2027 and the Qatari share depends on Hormuz.
• TTF-JKM spread: when Asia pays more, cargoes leave the Atlantic; a JKM premium above $2/MMBtu has historically diverted supply from Europe.

FAQ

Where does Europe get its gas from now? In 2025 the EU imported about 289 bcm: Norway supplied 31%, the United States 26%, Algeria and Libya 13%, Russia 12.5%, the UK 4%, Azerbaijan 4% and Qatar 4%, according to the European Commission. Norway dominates pipeline supply and the US dominates LNG, which is now about half of all EU gas imports.

How much gas does the EU still import from Russia? About 36 bcm in 2025, 12.5% of imports, split between pipeline gas via TurkStream (mainly to Hungary and Slovakia) and LNG from Yamal (mainly to France, Belgium and Spain). Russia's share of EU LNG was still 17.3% in the first quarter of 2026. Regulation 2026/261 ends long-term LNG contracts on 1 January 2027 and pipeline contracts by 30 September 2027.

Is Europe's gas supply at risk from the Strait of Hormuz closure? Indirectly. Only about 7% of Europe's LNG came through Hormuz in 2025, but the closure removed roughly 20% of global LNG supply, so Asian buyers compete for the US cargoes Europe relies on. That competition, plus damage at Qatar's Ras Laffan plant, pushed TTF to €84/MWh in September 2026 and left EU storage around 68% in mid-September, well below the seasonal norm.

Why is the EU so dependent on imported gas? Domestic production has fallen for two decades (Groningen closed in 2024) while gas still heats about 30% of EU homes and supplies roughly a third of power and heat generation. Consumption fell 19% between 2021 and 2024, but around 330 bcm a year still has to be sourced, and the only large pipeline suppliers left are Norway and North Africa, so LNG fills the rest.